Non-empirical uncertainties in evidence-based decision making. by Ongaro, Malvina & Andreoletti, Mattia
This is the authors’ final version; the article has been accepted for publication in 
Perspectives on Science 
 
1 
Non-empirical uncertainties in evidence-based decision making. 
Malvina Ongaro (University of Eastern Piedmont) 
Malvina.ongaro@uniupo.it 
Mattia Andreoletti (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University)  
Andreoletti.mattia@unisr.it 
Abstract. The increasing success of the evidence-based policy movement is raising the 
demand of empirically informed decision making. As arguably any policy decision 
happens under conditions of uncertainty, following our best available evidence to reduce 
the uncertainty seems a requirement of good decision making. However, not all the 
uncertainty faced by decision makers can be resolved by evidence. In this paper, we build 
on a philosophical analysis of uncertainty to identify the boundaries of scientific advice 
in policy decision making. We start by introducing a distinction between empirical and 
non-empirical types of uncertainty, and we explore the role of two non-empirical 
uncertainties in the context of policy making. We argue that the authority of scientific 
advisors is limited to empirical uncertainty and cannot extend beyond it. While the appeal 
of evidence-based policy rests on a view of scientific advice as limited to empirical 
uncertainty, in practice there is a risk of over-reliance on experts beyond the legitimate 
scope of their authority. We conclude by applying our framework to a real-world case of 
evidence-based policy, where experts have overstepped their boundaries by ignoring non-
empirical types of uncertainty. 
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1. Evidence-based decision making. 
Uncertainty is a pervasive feature of decision making. Decisions are aimed at reaching or 
avoiding some results, but we may be uncertain about which of the actions at our disposal 
will bring about the desired outcome. We typically ignore the exact consequences of our 
actions, just as we cannot be sure about the circumstances in which they will happen. 
Indeed, arguably any decision we face happens under some degree of uncertainty. If this 
is so, then it seems that good decision making should try to reduce that uncertainty, and 
make choices that are as informed as possible. 
With regard to policy decision making, Banerjee & Duflo (2011: 16) claim that many 
policies fail due to ignorance – specifically, ignorance about what actually works. Under 
this view, policy makers are at fault in their decision making process because they do not 
strive to reduce the uncertainty surrounding their decisions. Instead, to make good policy 
decisions they should listen to scientists, who may be in the position to provide evidence 
in support or against the options at stake. The view that policy decisions should be based 
on scientific evidence has fuelled a movement that has enjoyed a rising success in the last 
few decades (Banerjee et al. 2016a; Ravallion 2018), culminating in the recent Nobel 
Prize awarded to some of its most prominent figures (Royal Swedish Academic of 
Sciences 2019). 
The advocates of this account, known as Evidence-Based Policy movement (EBP), call 
for the incorporation of rigorous and robust scientific evidence in policy decision making. 
Its success has led to the proliferation of empirical studies in social policies, and to the 
increasing authority of experts (economists) in policy decisions. This trend has reignited 
the debate over the relationship between science and policy in general, and between 
evidence and values in particular. While the traditional debate focussed on the role of 
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values in evidence gathering (e.g. Rudner 1953; Longino 1990; Douglas 2000; Steel 
2010), the rise of EBP has fostered new sets of questions. Some authors have questioned 
the ethical validity of randomisation (Ravallion 2014; 2018), while others have 
illuminated the relation between policy evaluations and the empirical methods used (Dede 
2019). Finally, some have investigated the trade-offs between epistemic and non-
epistemic values in evidence for policy (Khosrowi 2019; Khosrowi & Reiss 2019). 
Here, we want to step back from the debate over empirical methodology and put the 
spotlight on the role scientific advice has in making evidence-based policy decisions. 
Policies are not decided by the scientists constructing the evidence. However, if good 
decision making should try to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the decision, then 
decision makers should listen to what science has to say on the matter at stake. But what 
does listen to science mean? 
Scientific advice could enter the decision making process as a recommendation about 
what should (not) be done. In light of their knowledge, experts could have reasons to 
support or oppose some courses of actions, and policymakers could listen to science in 
the sense of making decisions according to what the scientific community suggests. A 
second way in which scientific advice could enter the decision making process is not as 
opinion about the decision itself, but as information concerning some aspects of the 
decision. In this second sense, policymakers would listen to science insofar as the 
information they use in their deliberation comes from solid evidence. 
In this paper, we build on a philosophical analysis of the uncertainty faced by policy 
decision makers to understand the boundaries of scientific authority in decision making. 
While EBP may ground its appeal on an (often implicit) assumption of the role of 
scientific advisors as neutral providers of evidence, their practice risks to be closer to the 
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first role described. We start by introducing the concept of non-empirical uncertainty, 
building on Bradley & Drechsler’s (2014) seminal work on the taxonomy of uncertainties. 
We focus on two types of non-empirical uncertainty that play a crucial role in decision 
making and that are particularly relevant in policy contexts. The presence of these 
uncertainties set the boundaries for the authority of scientific advisors in policy decision 
making, which is limited to empirical types of uncertainty. We then proceed to discuss 
some limitations in the practice of EBP that make evidence-based decision making more 
exposed to the first type of scientific advising. We conclude by discussing a real-world 
case in which EBP practitioners have overstepped the boundaries set by non-empirical 
uncertainties. 
2. Non-empirical uncertainties 
Decision making is a process of resolving uncertainty. Trivially, the agent facing a 
decision does not know what to do, and is therefore in a situation of practical uncertainty 
(Peter 2020), i.e. uncertainty concerning the course of action to take: making a decision 
is resolving practical uncertainty. Understanding the nature of this uncertainty is therefore 
crucial for understanding good decision making. 
Since its origins (e.g. Ramsey 1926; Savage 1954), contemporary decision theory has 
been developing probabilistic tools to tackle uncertainty. The standard view is that the 
uncertain aspect of decisions can be entirely captured by one probability function over 
possible states of the world. Even though in most real-life cases it is impossible to assign 
precise probabilities to alternative states, sophistications of standard decision theory 
aiming to capture this more severe uncertainty still strive to do so in probabilistic terms, 
e.g. using families of probability functions (e.g. Levi 1980; Joyce 2010) or second-order 
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weights on probabilities (e.g. Gärdenfors & Sahlin 1983; Klibanoff et al. 2005; 
Chateauneuf & Faro 2009). 
The assumption behind this enterprise is that the only obstacle on the decision maker’s 
path is the lack of adequate information – albeit with different degrees of severity. If all 
the indecision were due to uncertainty about what is or will be the case, then it would be 
entirely resolved once the adequate empirical knowledge was provided. In principle, there 
is some evidence that could effectively resolve the agent’s practical uncertainty. Then, 
the best option would be the one leading straightforwardly to the preferred outcome. 
Unfortunately, practical uncertainty is not entirely reducible to lack of information. In 
itself, knowledge of the state of the world does not imply any choice: the agent may still 
be unsure about what to do even under complete certainty. Decision theory focuses on 
the part of practical uncertainty concerning the agent’s descriptive judgements, i.e. her 
beliefs about what is or will be the case. Following Bradley & Drechsler (2014), we call 
this type of uncertainty empirical. However, there is growing work showing that not all 
the uncertainty is empirical. For instance, in his typology of uncertainty, Hansson (1996) 
identifies four components of what he labels “great” uncertainty, neither of which 
concerns the state of the world. Helgeson (2020) investigates “deep” uncertainty in the 
structuring of decisions. Bradley & Drechsler (2014) themselves identify uncertainties 
concerning normative and modal judgements, as well as descriptive (see also Dietrich & 
Jabarian 2018). Non-empirical uncertainties are those types of uncertainty that do not 
concern the actual state of the world, and that therefore cannot be solved by evidence. 
If there are non-empirical types of uncertainty, then supporting a policy “because it is 
evidence-based” may be misleading. Support for a policy means choosing that policy 
over some alternatives: it implies a decision. But reaching a decision means that all the 
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uncertainty around it has been accommodated, one way or another. If, as we say, some of 
this uncertainty is insensitive to evidence because it is non-empirical, then no policy can 
ever be chosen entirely on evidential grounds. Choosing a policy will always require some 
non-empirical judgements, no matter the amount of evidence available. 
In the next two sections, we focus on two types of non-empirical uncertainty that play an 
important role in decisions for policy making. We build on Bradley & Drechsler’s 
taxonomy and identify these uncertainties as ethical and state space uncertainty. In each 
case, we present the uncertainty starting from Bradley & Drechsler’s account. Then, we 
clarify the sense in which these uncertainties are non-empirical. Finally, we elaborate on 
the original account to illuminate the elements relevant to policy making. 
 
 
2.1 Ethical uncertainty 
The agent picks a certain option when she finds it more desirable than the alternatives. If 
she is uncertain with respect to the desirability of some alternative, she is in a situation of 
ethical uncertainty. According to Bradley & Drechsler, ethical uncertainty arises when 
the values used to assess the desirability of the different alternatives are unknown or non-
existent (2014: 1237). They identify three main views on the nature and possibility of this 
uncertainty, and we will show that each has different implications for policy making. 
The first position is ethical subjectivism, which is taken to be the most prominent position. 
According to this view, ethical uncertainty concerns the degree to which a certain 
alternative is desirable, and so it concerns one’s own judgements of desirability. For the 
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subjectivist, ethical uncertainty is virtually impossible, as it would require one to be 
uncertain about their own tastes. The opposite view is labelled ethical cognitivism. This 
view takes ethical uncertainty to be about beliefs over some objective normative facts. It 
is a matter of truth whether something is good or not, and therefore desirability can be the 
object of uncertain beliefs. The third view they consider to be intermediate between the 
first two. It takes ethical uncertainty to concern judgements over some factual properties 
of the agent, namely her tastes. 
Now, the last two views reduce ethical uncertainty to a case of empirical uncertainty. For 
the cognitivist, ethical uncertainty is simply empirical uncertainty over a specific class of 
beliefs. However, the reduction of ethical uncertainty to empirical uncertainty comes at 
the cost of assuming realism about what is good. In the intermediate view, ethical 
uncertainty concerns factual judgements, and therefore is empirical - but it requires to see 
tastes as facts about someone. 
On the other hand, the ethical subjectivist does not see tastes as some fact about what is 
desirable or about the agent. If she is right, then there is no procedure-independent correct 
answer to the question of how to evaluate the available alternatives. As there is nothing 
to discover about the desirability of the options, then no amount of evidence could solve 
the uncertainty. Once all the relevant information is available, whether something is more 
valuable than something else remains a non-empirical question. 
Without trying to settle the debate over which of these views is the adequate 
understanding of ethical uncertainty, let us now explore the implications they have for 
policy making. To do so, we assume that the crucial difference between individual 
decision making and policy decision making is that the latter concerns a plurality of 
stakeholders. 
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Ethical cognitivism implies that there is a correct way to evaluate the different 
alternatives. If the decision maker is uncertain, then she can find out something more 
about what is valuable. In sum, she should treat her uncertainty over values just as her 
uncertainty over facts: as something that can go away with the right information. This is 
so whether the decision concerns individual choices or policy options. While this position 
makes ethical uncertainty a fully empirical issue, it does so at the cost of requiring strong 
realism over what is good - a position that may be at odds with the practices of democracy, 
which typically assume some pluralism. 
The intermediate view has some more interesting implications. If the preferences of all 
the stakeholders are relevant for the decision, and not just the personal preferences of 
whoever happens to be making the decision for everybody, then ethical uncertainty in 
policy contexts amounts to uncertainty over the stakeholders’ evaluation of the 
alternatives. According to the intermediate view, this is empirical uncertainty over some 
factual features of the people involved: each stakeholder has some tastes, and ethical 
uncertainty means not knowing some of these tastes. However, while ethical uncertainty 
could be reduced to empirical uncertainty in single-agent contexts, in policy making it 
involves an additional level: even if the decision maker had all the information about 
everybody’s tastes, she would still need to aggregate all that information into one single 
evaluation. But there is no independently correct procedure to do so. Non-empirical 
uncertainty comes back at this higher-level decision making. 
Let us now look at the fully non-empirical view, namely ethical subjectivism. This view 
claims that there is no correct answer to the question of how desirable some alternative 
is. Therefore, it is possible that some stakeholders disagree on how to evaluate the 
alternatives, and that this disagreement is irreducible: it may be due to different subjective 
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evaluations, none of which is inherently wrong. People may legitimately disagree on the 
evaluation even starting from the same background knowledge. 
In this case, the answer to the question of desirability must come from a certain side of 
the disagreement. It is a situated answer, coming from a specific standpoint on the issue. 
On whose evaluations should the decision be based? Whether the evaluation is the 
decision maker’s, the experts’, the result of some averaged aggregation, or is settled via 
standard democratic procedures - it is still only one of the admissible (i.e., not incorrect) 
evaluations. In the absence of an independently correct answer, the uncertainty over the 
question of desirability is non-empirical. 
 
 
2.2. State space uncertainty 
The state space of a decision is the set of possible states of the world, i.e. the worldly 
contingencies on which the outcomes depend. Standardly, decision theory takes the state 
space as given, and does not question the elements included in or excluded from it. 
Nonetheless, in real-world decisions state spaces are not ready-made: the agent has to 
build her own. State space uncertainty arises whenever the decision maker is aware of the 
possibility that she has not included all the relevant contingencies in her state space 
(Bradley & Drechsler 2014: 1245). 
The possibility of state space uncertainty has given rise to a prolific literature on decision 
making under unawareness, i.e. in those circumstances where the agent is aware that she 
may be unaware of some contingency (Schipper 2014; Karni & Vierø 2017). In this basic 
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form, this type of uncertainty seems to be empirical, albeit of extreme severity. Far from 
being able to assign precise probabilities, the agent has no information whatsoever 
regarding those contingencies of which she is unaware. However, it is a matter of fact 
whether those contingencies obtain or not, and in principle there is some evidence that 
could resolve her uncertainty. 
There is, however, an important non-empirical element to state space uncertainty. It is 
clear that the agent cannot be aware of all possible contingencies, let alone include them 
in her state space. Indeed, state space uncertainty concerns all the relevant contingencies. 
The question that the agent faces when constructing the state space is not whether she has 
included all the possible things that may be the case or that may happen - rather, she faces 
the question of what to include in the state space. This means that unawareness is only 
one way in which some relevant contingency may be left out of the state space. The other 
is selection - the agent may overlook something, consciously excluding it as something 
that is not relevant to the matter at hand. 
Since it is impossible to include every eventuality in the state space, then it is always 
possible that the agent has omitted something relevant. Thus, state space uncertainty is 
pervasive in decision making, simply because any decision requires a selection of the 
relevant factors on which to base it, and the selection may turn out to be inadequate. 
However, to an important extent being relevant to a decision is not an empirical property. 
Relevance is the result of a subjective judgement of the decision maker. Therefore, state 
space uncertainty is non-empirical, because what counts as relevant is not an external 
fact. 
If this is so - if judgements of relevance are subjective - then the question of what to 
include in the state space does not have a correct answer. This means that, once again, it 
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is possible that different agents disagree on what should be included, and that this 
disagreement is irreducible. 
The same reasoning applies to the inclusion of consequences in the structuring of the 
decision problem. The agent’s decision does not depend only on factual contingencies, 
but also on which consequences she expects from the performance of each alternative 
option. Now, actions can have a variety of effects. The agent may be unaware of some of 
these - she may not expect a certain option to result in a certain effect, and therefore 
exclude it from her considerations. But she may also exclude some effects as irrelevant 
for her evaluation of the options. Again, this judgement of relevance is subjective, and 
people can disagree on which effects matter and which do not. 
Therefore, the selection of the elements - contingencies and consequences - on which to 
base the decision is the result of an agent-relative judgement of relevance. This has direct 
implications for policy decisions since, as we have noted, policy decisions impact on a 
plurality of stakeholders. Different actors may have different opinions on what matters in 
a certain decision. They may consider different consequences of the policy options as the 
ones that are truly at stake, and they may have different ideas as to which facts of the 
world these consequences depend on. As there is no single correct answer, different 
positions can be equally legitimate: they may represent different priorities on the matter 
at hand. 
For these reasons, the existence of robust evidence about some of the policy effects does 
not imply that the evidence effectively settles the issue. Some stakeholders may think that 
it does, because the only thing that matters is whether a certain action produces some 
specific set of effects. Others may claim that it misses the point entirely, because those 
effects are not really what the issue is about. But their disagreement is not due to lack of 
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sufficient information, as to different priority settings. And priority setting has more to 
do with normative considerations than with empirical ones. 
3. The role of scientific advice 
In light of the uncertainties we have reviewed, we can say that an agent’s practical 
uncertainty with respect to a decision comprises at least three different types of 
uncertainty. An agent may be uncertain about what to do because she lacks some crucial 
information about the actual state of the world (empirical uncertainty), because she does 
not know how to evaluate the possible consequences of her actions (ethical uncertainty), 
or because she is not sure about which contingencies and consequences she should take 
into consideration (state space uncertainty). In the context of policy making, the presence 
of a variety of stakeholders implies that both ethical uncertainty and state space 
uncertainty may be ascribable to some irreducible disagreement over value systems and 
priorities. As this disagreement is not over some matter of fact, for which there is a correct 
solution, it cannot be settled by evidence. 
We are now in a position to better qualify the role of scientific advisors in the reduction 
of practical uncertainty. We have seen that there are two possible ways in which their role 
in decision making can be cashed out: they can provide opinions as to which option 
should be pursued or avoided, or they can abstain from opinions and limit themselves to 
the provision of data and information. The scientific advisor who followed the first route 
would need to have an opinion on the decision at stake. In order to form that opinion, she 
will have to solve the practical uncertainty surrounding the decisions: to say that option 
a is better than option b she has to solve the decision problem. In order to do that, the 
scientific advisor has to face both empirical and non-empirical uncertainties. On the other 
This is the authors’ final version; the article has been accepted for publication in 
Perspectives on Science 
 
13 
hand, scientific advice along the second route does not require a stance on what to do, 
and thus the resolution of non-empirical uncertainties. 
As any stakeholder, the scientific advisor can form an opinion on the decision at stake. In 
order to do so, she will rely on her expertise to resolve the empirical components of the 
uncertainty. But as for the non-empirical components, she is in no special position with 
respect to other stakeholders. The specific authority of the scientific advisor is epistemic 
in nature: it is authority over the formation of beliefs about the state of the world. 
Epistemic authority does not grant practical authority, i.e. authority over what should be 
done. Thus, the opinion of the scientific advisor formed on her scientific knowledge is 
not more valuable than that of other stakeholders with the same scientific knowledge at 
their disposal. If this is so, then the role of scientific advisory in evidence-based decision 
making is to provide the scientific knowledge with which to reduce the empirical 
uncertainty, rather than fully formed opinions on the decision itself. 
The appeal of EBP presupposes this second account of scientific advice. In this account, 
scientific advisors do not address questions regarding the desirability of policy 
interventions or their different priority. This allows EBP advocates to claim that their 
judgements regarding policy interventions are essentially neutral. Experts’ judgements 
are authoritative insofar as they concern the area on which experts hold justified authority. 
Insofar as these judgements are only relative to empirical uncertainty – that is, insofar as 
they are provisions of evidence and data – then they are authoritative, because experts 
hold justified epistemic authority on empirical issues. 
However, this view seems to be in contrast with what actually happens in contemporary 
scientific advising. Nowadays, science is pervasive in every aspect of our society, and 
scientists occupy influential and important roles in governments. This creates political 
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pressure on the decision makers. Even if scientific advisors limited themselves to 
“neutral” (i.e. limited to empirical uncertainty) advising, it might be “uncomfortable and 
politically risky” to ignore it (Douglas 2009, p.43 ). If the advice seems to favour some 
option, then in the eyes of the general public decision makers should privilege that option 
as this is “what science says”. So, even if scientific advisors themselves only provided 
evidence, their advice may be transformed into a fully formed opinion, and decision 
makers are likely to be pressured into following that opinion. 
Moreover, there are many cases where clear recommendations on what to do is openly 
requested to scientific experts. This is the case, for instance, of regulatory decisions on 
new pharmacological treatments. Governmental agencies such as the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) are political 
institutions which nonetheless grant market approval decisions on scientific 
recommendation. For each request of drug approval, the regulatory agencies summon 
advisory committees of experts to assess “whether the safety and effectiveness 
information submitted for a new drug is adequate for marketing approval” (Andreoletti 
& Teira 2019). The committees are asked to vote for or against. Although their 
conclusions are not mandatory for the agencies, they are almost always accepted. 
According to empirical studies of scientific advisory and regulatory decisions, the 
agencies’ decisions are very consistent with the advisory committee votes (see e.g. 
Zuckerman 2006). 
Finally, the rhetoric around EBP is itself ambivalent. On one hand, it criticizes policy 
making as being ideologically driven and biased by preconceptions, stressing the need of 
the neutral eye of science to identify effective policies. In doing so, it seems to blame 
policy making for introducing ideology into the realm of empirical uncertainty, where in 
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principle objectively correct answers are possible. On the other hand, it conveys the idea 
that we should make policies that the evidence shows to work. But that a policy works is 
an incomplete description: a policy works on some aspect, it works in some way and for 
certain stakeholders. Overlooking these specifications assumes that however they are 
resolved in the evidence is what should matter in the policy context. In doing so, EBP 
proponents are not just providing useful data to make an informed decision, but they are 
effectively shaping the choice. The rhetoric of “what works” tries to cleanse policy 
making from ideology beyond empirical uncertainty, where however value-laden stances 
are unavoidable. 
The focus on effectiveness in contrast with ideology may lead to considering it as the 
main criterion to choose a policy. In this case, scientific advisors may end up transforming 
their judgements of effectiveness into opinions of which policy should be implemented, 
thus crossing the boundaries of empirical uncertainty. The experimental approach itself 
can then start to be seen as an instrument of persuasion, to push policy makers in one 
direction thanks to the epistemic authority of scientific methods: 
One way to interpret the series of (…) studies is as a process of persuasion at 
scale: the experimental approach played not only an evaluation role but also 
an instrumental role in fostering acceptance of the policy by the government. 
(…) From that perspective, the experimental approach is a little like opening 
a jammed door with a pry-bar. First you stick the bar in a little crack, and get 
a little traction. Then you move to another location, and get a little more 
traction. When you’ve got a little more purchase, you can jam in a bigger pry-
bar and really tug hard. (…) At some point, the leverage is great enough that 
you can throw the door open. Sequential experimentation becomes a political 
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economy tool for getting momentum for policy change. (Banerjee et al. 2017: 
31). 
The scientific advisor has decided that the policy they are evaluating is one that should 
be implemented, and uses the experiments on which this judgement is based to promote 
it. Evidence can thus become a political instrument to support different policies, even 
though without some (value-laden) evaluation of its consequences and some (value-
laden) assessment of its relevance it cannot directly support anything. In the next section, 
we present a case in which EBP practitioners moved from the role of providers of 
evidence to policy supporters, thus moving beyond empirical uncertainty. 
4. A real world application: the case of TaRL Africa 
So far, we have analysed two types of non-empirical uncertainty and the boundaries they 
set for the role of scientific advice in policy making. It is now time to see how this 
theoretical framework can help highlight how EBP can overstep these boundaries by 
looking at a real case of evidence-based policy making. 
A prominent promoter of the EBP movement is the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action 
Lab (J-PAL). Founded in 2003 by MIT professors Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and 
Sendhil Mullainathan “with the goal of transforming how the world approaches the 
challenges of global poverty” (J-PAL 2020), it has grown to involve over 400 
professionals. Nowadays, programmes based on its evaluations have reached more than 
400 million people around the globe. One of J-PAL’s flagship works is “Teaching at the 
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Right Level” (TaRL)1, an education programme developed in collaboration with the 
Indian NGO Pratham. 
In the early 2000s, Pratham started to experiment a new pedagogy to fight low literacy 
among children (Banerjee et al. 2017). The core idea was to divide the kids, for some part 
of the day or for some period of the year, according to their abilities rather than their age: 
this was supposed to facilitate the children’s literacy acquisition. As the programme 
started expanding, researchers from J-PAL got involved with Pratham to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their method and guide its scaling-up. Several years and six randomised 
experiments later (Banerjee et al. (2007), (2010), (2016b)), TaRL reached a national 
scale, involving millions of kids. 
In Delhi, government schools applied Pratham's methods in 2016. But TaRL has been 
seen as implementing a policy of segregation in classrooms, leading some parents to file 
a lawsuit against Delhi government2. In fact, teachers testify that level-based division has 
an impact on the identity formation of children, that are now often identified with their 
level. According to them, this has translated into bullyism and demotivation. Moreover, 
teachers accuse that, within this discriminatory system, students classified as “bad 
learners” are given less interesting and engaging teaching activities3. 
Banerjee et al. (2017) present the series of experiments conducted with Pratham precisely 
as a virtuous example of how to successfully scale up an intervention, from piloting tests 
to policy implementations at the large scale. The basic gist of Pratham’s TaRL pedagogy 
was tested in a variety of contexts, proving effective in Indian states with very different 
 
1 https://www.teachingattherightlevel.org/ 
2 Delhi:  Chunauti scheme faces challenge in Delhi High Court 
3 https://thewire.in/education/delhi-schools-ability-based-grouping 
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socio-economic profiles. For them, the challenge was to find ways to implement TaRL 
core principles outside of the specificities of Pratham’s own programme. The evaluations 
showed which implementations worked better. Furthermore, they showed that problems 
arising when the programme was implemented in government schools could be overcome 
with constant support from Pratham’s staff. 
In virtue of the results provided by the evaluations, their authors provide full support to 
policies based on TaRL. Recently, J-PAL and Pratham started the joint venture “TaRL 
Africa” to export Pratham’s pedagogy to Africa. On January 15th, 2019, the philanthropic 
collaborative Co-Impact granted a millionaire commitment in support of TaRL Africa, 
which was chosen with other four initiatives from a pool of 250 candidates4. Iqbal 
Dhaliwal, Executive Director of J-PAL, commented on the commitment as a victory for 
evidence-based policy making: 
“This grant represents the critical importance of using evidence from rigorous 
impact evaluations to drive decision making”. (J-PAL news release). 
However, the experiments provide reasons for a policy to the extent that policy choice 
requires the reduction of empirical uncertainty. But, as we have argued, there are 
uncertainties that cannot be resolved empirically. 
TaRL Africa is a case of policy promotion, rather than just intervention evaluation. As 
we have seen, winning the Co-Impact funds was done at the expense of other policy 
proposals. The researchers are supporting a policy over other policies, addressing 
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support is the result of a decision. As such, it has involved judgements of relevance and 
desirability, as well as of effectiveness. Let us look more closely at how non-empirical 
uncertainties are at play in the TaRL case. 
As we have seen, ethical uncertainty concerns the evaluation of the outcomes of the 
intervention. We can imagine, for instance, that the teachers or the families that will be 
touched by TaRL Africa would not evaluate it positively, because in their view bullyism 
is more worrying than slow literacy acquisition. If there is disagreement among the 
stakeholders as to the value of the outcomes of the intervention, then its promotion 
implies the adoption of only one of the available evaluations. But since the disagreement 
may be due to different priority settings, then the choice of an evaluation may be the 
choice of a priority setting. And that is not an empirical issue. Thus, the promotion of a 
policy based on an intervention that raised mixed feelings requires a normative choice 
over what to prioritise in the intervention outcomes. Indeed, if ethical subjectivism is 
right, the promotion of any policy comes from a specific standpoint. 
As for state space uncertainty, it comprises two levels. On the higher level, Co-Impact is 
not limited to education policies. Thus, promoting a policy targeting education over 
policies targeting other social issues implies that education is more relevant. On the lower 
level, education itself is made of a variety of components. TaRL has mixed effects: while 
it has positive effects on the rate of literacy acquisition, it has been claimed to have 
negative effects on children’s self-esteem and on bullyism. The promotion of TaRL in 
the name of the former set of effects implies that they are more relevant than the latter. 
But this is not an empirical judgement, and as such it cannot be settled by evidence. The 
promotion of a policy based on TaRL is therefore the result of a normative choice as to 
what matters in education, as well as to what matters in development. In this case, 
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choosing TaRL because experiments show its effectiveness in literacy acquisition means 
that literacy acquisition is a more relevant effect than others. But since judgements of 
relevance are subjective, then disagreements are both possible and legitimate, and cannot 
be settled by resorting to evidence. 
5. Conclusion 
Decision makers often lack complete information on the key contingencies of their 
decisions. Systems on which policies intervene are complex and the spectrum of choices 
available is very wide. Most of the time then decision makers get hung up on the nitty-
gritties of a conundrum. Resorting to scientific evidence has been offered as a way out of 
this impasse. The surge of the Evidence-Based Policy movement in the last decades has 
sparked academic and non-academic debates on the legitimacy of its approach. In this 
paper, we looked at the role of scientific advice in evidence-based decision making. We 
framed decision making as a process of resolution of practical uncertainty, and showed 
that this comprises both empirical and non-empirical uncertainty. We used this 
framework to claim that, while the appeal of EBP rests on an understanding of scientific 
advice as limited to the reduction of empirical uncertainty, in practice its impact on 
decision making tends to be larger. The case of TaRL Africa shows how EBP researchers 
may move beyond empirical uncertainty to promote a policy that their evidence proves 
to be effective. As promoting a policy implies having chosen that policy, it faces ethical 
and state space uncertainty. Their resolution requires judgements of relevance and 
desirability that are outside of the epistemic authority of scientific advisors. 
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